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TACKING LEFT: A RADICAL CRITIQUE OF
GRUTTER
Daria Roithmayr*
[Rjace conscious policies must be limited in time ... We
expect that twenty-five years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.
Justice O'Connor in Grutter v. Bollinger'

INTRODUCTION
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court announced its
expectation that twenty-five years from now, U.S. educational
institutions will no longer need to use racial conscious affirmative action in admissions to admit a racially diverse class. Of
course, time will tell whether Justice O'Connor's expectation
will be given the force of law or regarded as dicta. 2 But dicta or
not, law schools are highly unlikely in the next twenty-five years
to be able to admit diverse classes without using race-conscious
affirmative action. Racial inequality at all levels-education,
housing, income and wealth- has become a remarkably stable
feature of racial hierarchy in the U.S. 3
Certainly with regard to conventional measures of merit for
law school admission (i.e., grades and standardized test scores),
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois. Thanks to Nancy Cantor,
Evan Caminker, Don Herzog, Laura Beny and Kimberle Crenshaw for provocative debate and disagreement, counterassertions and general conversation about Grutter and
affirmative action. Thanks to Dave McGowan, Tom Ulen and Ian Ayres, for helpful
comments and assistance in understanding obscure economic math. Thanks also to Ryan
Calo for research assistance on various parts of this Essay. All errors and wrongheaded
arguments arc, of course, my own.
l. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342-43 (2003).
2. See Vikram Amar & Evan Caminker, Constitutional Sunsetting? Justice
O'Connor's Closing Comments in Gruttcr, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541 (2003) (discussing the question of whether the sunset clause was dicta or to be given force of law).
3. MICHAEL BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLORBLIJSD SOCIETY 12-15 (2003) (documenting black-white disparities in income, housing,
and health care).
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racial disparities are as pervasive as they were when the Court
decided Bakke twenty-five years ago. For the 2002-03 academic
year, the median LSAT score for black applicants was 142.2,
compared to a median white score of 153.9.<t Thus, at present,
black scores are about 19 percent lower than white scores. The
differences at the top end of the scale are far more dramatic:
blacks make up less than 1 percent of those scoring 165 or above
on the LSAT. By most accounts, the gap has persisted for the
last twenty-five years, despite improvements in the economy and
a growing black middle-class. 6 Moreover, the racial gap in LSAT
scores may now be increasing. Over the past five years, the racial
scoring gap has increased by 0.9 points, or 1.5 percent. 7
For the last decade, the issue of affirmative action in higher
education has bedeviled those of us on the left. Even the most
radical of critical race theorists acknowledges that, in connection
with Grutter, we needed to defend small-scale diversity-oriented
programs in order to hold the line on affirmative action rollbacks. As a symbolic matter, affirmative action represented the
most visible form of commitment to dismantling racial hierarchy.
And, in the wake of Hopwood and Proposition 209, radical
scholars had to acknowledge the very real possibility that an increasingly conservative Supreme Court would cut back even further on the vitality of race-conscious preferences. Holding the
line in Grutter was of the essence in the battle with conservatives
over affirmative action.
At the same time, as a practical matter, we recognized the
limits of diversity-based affirmative action. The small-scale affirmative action programs adopted by law schools produced few
material gains for most people in communities of color. We
knew that in most elite schools, diversity programs admit rela4. Latest News: A Widening Racial Gap in Law School Applications and Scores on
the Law School Admission Test, 1. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. available at http://www.

jbhe.comllatest/052004_law-school_admissions.html (May 20, 2004).
5. Latest News: Very Few Blacks Can Be Found at Top of LSAT Scoring Pyramid,
J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. available at www.jbhe.com/latest/052704_blacks_and_
LSAT.html (May 27, 2004).
6. See LINDA WIGHTMAN, BEYOND FY A: AN ANALYSIS OF THE UTILITY OF
LSAT SCORES AND UNDERGRADUATE GPA FOR PREDICTING ACADEMIC SUCCESS IN
LAW SCHOOL 8-14 (2000). See also The Persisting Racial Scoring Gap in Graduate and
Professional School Admissions Tests, 38 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. (Winter 2002/2003)
(documenting a persistent 18% gap). See also Special Report: Confronting the Widening
Racial Scoring Gap on the SAT, 41 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. (Autumn, 2003); THE
BLACK WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998).
7. In 1997-98, the median black LSAT score was 142.7. The median white score
was 153.5. See Latest News, supra note 4.
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tively small numbers of students. 8 We acknowledged that diversity-oriented programs concealed the racial bias of ostensibly
race-neutral standards.9 And from experience within our own institutions, we were painfully aware that the diversity rationale
permitted institutions to claim that they were "for affirmative action," without having to make a commitment to eliminating the
legacy of past discrimination. 10
Ultimately, in the period leading up to the Court's decision
in Grutter, many of us committed ourselves and our scholarship
(despite our ambivalence) to the very pragmatic task of defending diversity-based affirmative action. But now that the Court
has approved some form of race-conscious affirmative action,
the time may have come for the left to tack left again: to strongly
reassert the far more expansive view of racial equality, and to
argue for a much larger-scale, much more robust form of affirmative action to accompany that view.
In that spirit, this article advances three central critiques of
the Court's decision in Grutter-one pragmatic, one utopian and
the last deeply cynical. First, I will argue that Justice O'Connor's
timetable for eliminating race-conscious affirmative action is unrealistic. Racial inequality in conventional measures of merit will
persist into the foreseeable future, because this inequality is part
of a much larger dynamic process that produces persistent racial
inequality in many areas.
I describe this process using what I have come to call the
"lock-in" model of racial inequality. 11 The lock-in model compares persistent racial disparity to persistent monopoly power
that continues long after the original anti-competitive conduct
has ceased. Just as a monopoly can become institutionally selfreinforcing over time, so too can racial monopoly reproduce itself over time via institutional processes.
This Essay proposes that disparities in performance on admissions criteria persist because whites have created a selfreinforcing monopoly on those educational resources that are
needed to achieve high GPAs and standardized test scores. If so,
See infra Part III.
See id.
10. See id.
II. For a full description of the lock-in model of racial inequality, sec Daria Raith·
mayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727
(2000). See also Daria Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality: The Persistence of DiscriminatiOn, 9 MICH. J. RACE AND L. 31 (2003); Daria Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation (unpublished draft, on file with author).
8.

9.
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racial disparities likely will continue, as will the need for some
form of affirmative action, until that monopoly is dismantled,
Second, I will argue that diversity-based affirmative action
does little to address what may well be locked-in disparities. Experts insist that, to dismantle the self-reinforcing cycle, massive
affirmative action is needed. Unfortunately, Grutter is the last in
a long line of cases that forecloses the very sort of large-scale affirmative action programs in education that could assist in creating change.
Third, I will argue that, although Grutter provides little material benefit for communities of color, the decision materially
and symbolically privileges white interests. The opinion prioritizes the interests of white students in breaking down their
stereotypes about minorities and in adding diverse perspectives
to classroom conversations. In addition, the Court's opinion allows institutions to conceal the bias of conventional admissions
standards. Last but not least, the Court's opinion constitutionally
protects elite meritocracy, in a way that further privileges white
interests.
Part I provides a brief primer on the self-reinforcing lock-in
model of inequality, which I have developed in previous work.
Part II applies the lock-in model to the problem of persistent racial disparities in education. This section focuses on the broad
self-reinforcing dynamic process that links a neighborhood's assets to those of families within the neighborhood. Drawing from
the insights developed from the lock-in model, Part III fully
fleshes out the three critiques of Grutter described above.
I. A PRIMER ON THE LOCK-IN MODEL OF

INEQUALITY
In previous work, I have developed the lock-in model of ra12
cial inequality to explain the dynamics of racial inequality.
Drawing from recent work in economics and antitrust, the lockin model is designed to explain how monopolies can become
self-reinforcing over time to become a permanent part of the
economic landscape. More specifically, the model demonstrates
12. See Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry, supra note 11 (developing the lock-in model
and arguing that the use of conventional law school admissions standards constitutes a
locked-in network standard that favors whites). See also Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality, supra note 11 (arguing that the South African government chose to retain educational
user fees despite their disproportionate racial impact because the government would mcur high switching costs to equalize expenditures across racial lines).
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how monopolies can persist even in the absence of intentional
anti-competitive conduct.
Locked-in monopolies can be produced in a variety of settings. In certain markets that are characterized by "increasing returns," a firm can acquire an early competitive advantage, which
then becomes self-reinforcing over time. For example, some
commentators argue that Microsoft engaged in exclusive contracts with suppliers and in other conduct designed to prevent
the distribution of competitor technology. 13 This anticompetitive conduct created (and reinforced) a self-reinforcing
advantage that linked software developers and consumers. Windows' popularity induced more software authors to write software, which in turn triggered an increase in consumers. The increase in consumers thereby induced even more software
authors to write for Windows, and so on. 14 Thus, Microsoft's advantage became locked-in because of the positive feedback loop
that permitted the advantage to reproduce itself.
Beyond increasing returns markets, a market might become
locked-in when consumers face high costs to switch ("switching
costs") from the market incumbent to a more innovative competitor.15 If consumers cannot make the switch easily, then their
unwillingness to move may lock in the incumbent's early advantage. For example, when consumers choose to switch from a
VCR to a DVD player, they must pay not only the cost of the
new product but also the cost to recreate their library in DVD
format and the cost of lost access to their video network- the
group of friends, family, video stores and other sources of videos
who may not yet have made the switch. 16 These additional
switching costs may prolong the initial competitive advantage
that the VCR technology has over the more innovative DVD
technology. 17

13. See Declaration of Prof. Franklin M. Fisher in Support of Plaintiff, USA v. Microsoft (147 F.3d 935) available ar http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f17(XJI1766.htm.
14. See, e.g., BRIAN W. ARTHVR, !NCREAS1NG RETURNS A"'D PATH DEPENDENCE
IN THE ECONOMY 102 (1994) (explaining the self-reinforcing process of increasing returns generally); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 13 (using the Microsoft example).
15. For a discussion of switching costs in the market context, sec A. Douglas
Melamed, Network Industries and Antitrust, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 150
(1999). For a discussion of the role of switching costs in the lock-in model of inequality
see Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality, supra note 11, at 61-65.
'
16. See Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality, supra note 11 at 39.
17. See id.
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Finally, "path-dependent" markets will also produce lockedin monopolies.I 8 In path dependent markets, small historical
events that happen early in the formation of the industry may explain a great deal about subsequent market outcomes.I 9 In the
most oft-cited example, Paul David asserts that a typing contest
held in 1874 ultimately produced the monopoly position of a particular keyboard arrangement in the typewriter market. 20 Because
the winning typist had used a QWERTY keyboard, the victory
produced a small competitive lead over other keyboards. 2 I
This "early-mover" advantage then became institutionally
self-reinforcing because of the "network" relationship between
typists, employers and keyboards. Typists wanted to train on the
most popular keyboard, and, in turn, employers wanted to adopt
the keyboard on which most typists were trained. 22 Each increase in typists produced an increase in employers who adopted
the keJboard, thereby triggering another increase in typists, and
so on. Ultimately, QWERTY came to dominate the field based
on the self-reinforcing effects of the early victory. 24
As this example demonstrates, institutionally selfreinforcing processes may become locked in if they create barriers to entry that prevent competitors from catching up. In the
QWERTY example, the early winner's competitive advantage
may have become locked in place because an employer who
wanted to switch to an alternative faced significant switching
costs-namely, the loss of a ready-trained labor pool. 25 Switching
costs can create barriers to entry for a competitor, and even for

18. For a full discussion of path dependence, see Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen H.
Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In and History, 111. L. ECON & ORO. 205 (1995). See
ARTHUR, supra note 14, at 102. See also Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry, supra note 11, at
742-49.
19. See Stanley M. Bcsen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies
and Tactics in Standardization, 81. ECON. PERSP. 117,118 (1994); Nicholas Economides,
The Economics of Networks, 14 INT'L J. INDUS. ORO 673,694 (1996).
20. See PAUL A. DAVID, UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF QWERTY: THE
NECESSITY OF HISTORY IN ECONOMIC HISTORY AND MODERN ECONOMICS 30-49 (William N. Parker ed., 1986). See also Paul David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75
AMER. ECON. REV. 332 (1985); Paul David, Why Are Institutions the 'Carriers of History'? Notes on Path-Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and
Institutions (October 1992) (unpublished paper).
21. The QWERTY keyboard begins with those letters on the upper row. See David,
Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, supra note 20, at 334.
22. See id. at 335.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
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those competitors who offer consumers a more "efficient" prod26
uct, like a more innovative keyboard arrangement.
Just as a firm's early monopoly advantage can become
locked into the market over time, so too can a racial cartel's
early monopoly advantage become institutionally impossible to
dismantle, even in the absence of continuing intentional discrimination. In the same way that a monopoly advantage can become self-reinforcing because of institutional structures, institutional racism can also reproduce inequality indefinitely.
The lock-in model puts forward three central claims about
the nature of racial inequality. First, early racial history matters.
Persistent racial inequality can be traced to earlier events that
have charted a particular course of history for different racial
groups? 7 As is true with the QWERTY example, the effect of
early monopoly efforts by white racial cartels may help to explain far more about contemporary outcomes than conventional
theory would predict. 28
Second, whites' early anti-competitive advantage may now
have become self-reinforcing?9 As with economic markets, in
race relations, early anti-competitive conduct can produce increasing returns for the early mover. In the context of residential
segregation, for example, early monopoly advantage can reproduce itself through a variety of mechanisms, including schooling
and networks of access to employment. 30
Third, in the absence of some intervening event, racial disparities may persist indefinitely. 31 Any policy looking to remedy
locked-in racial inequality would have to consider the structural
26. See id. at 332. Developed in the 1920s by August Dvorak, the Dvorak keyboard
arrangement is, according to some, a vastly superior keyboard arrangement when compared
to QWERTY. See R.C. CASSINGHAM, THE DVORAK KEYBOARD 21-16,41-43 (1986). For
an argument that the two keyboards are at best equally efficient, see Stan J. Liebowitz &
Steven E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice be a Concern Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. 1.
L. & TECH. 283, 312-14 (1996); STAN 1. LIEBOWITZ & STEVEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS,
LOSERS AND MICROSOFT (1999).
27. Borrowed from evolutionary theory, the concept of path dependence makes tht:
claim that early events can chart the evolutionary path of subsequent conditions for a
long time to come. See, e.g., Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 18; Mark J. Roc, Chaos
and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 634-52 (1996). See also
Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry, supra note 11, at 752; Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality,
supra note 11, at 66.
28. See id. In this project, I discussed the self-reinforcing impact of early decisions
to exclude people of color from legal education, and to develop admissions standards
that disproportionately excluded candidates of color. See id.
29. See id. at 65.
30. See Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation, supra note 11.
31. See Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality, supra note 11, at 61-64.
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and political switching costs of restructuring or modifying routine institutional practices. 32 If switching costs increase as time
passes, these costs may help to further cement in racial inequality as part of the U.S. sociallandscape. 33
II. LOCKED-IN EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY

A. EARLY ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONDUCT IN EDUCATION
This section argues that whites engaged in anti-competitive
activities and secured an early mover advantage in education resources, housing and other neighborhood-based assets. Other
scholars have documented the history of Jim Crow segregation
in public education. 34 This discussion concentrates more narrowly on cartel-like activities by a particular set of institutional
organizations in monopolizing education.
Economists use the concept of cartels to explain how groups
of people who might otherwise act individually to pursue their
own self-interest might nevertheless collaborate to exclude others from competition. 35 Robert Cooter and others have described how racial cartels worked to create and to maintain racial and economic exclusion, by: (i) agreeing on a collective
purpose to drive out competitors, (ii) constructing a complex set
32. In the law school admissions context, any law school contemplating a move to
reduce its reliance on the LSAT (e.g., to shift to a process that focuses on the student's
performance within a band of achievement) must face significant potential switching
costs in doing so. In particular, a school risks a potentially significant drop in its rankings
(by way of the U.S. News and World Report system, which prioritizes LSAT scores). In
addition, a school risks a corresponding loss of reputation, drop in enrollments, reduced
employability of graduates and reduced funding from alumni donors. Moreover, a law
school choosing to abandon the test altogether would have to incur the cost of developing and administering its own admissions test-the LSAT is currently administered for all
law schools by the centralized Law School Admissions Council. See Roithmayr, Barriers
to Entry, supra note 11.
33. Charles Tilly describes the concept of switching costs in his discussion of durable inequality.
Existing social arrangements have enduring advantages because their theoretical alternatives always entail the costs of movement away from the present
situation; change therefore occurs under conditions that reduce returns from existing arrangements, raise their current operating costs, lower the costs of transition to alternative arrangements or (much more rarely) increase expected returns from alternative sufficiently to overcome the transitions costs.
CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE INEQUALITY 192 (1998).
34. See, e.g., C. V ANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d cd.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1974).
35. See, e.g., GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION
167 (1946). For an excellent discussion of cartels in game theory and complex systems
theory, see Christopher Leslie, Trust, Distrust and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515 (2004).
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of informal and formal norms to coordinate collective conduct,
and (iii) imposing measures to punish members who defect
and/or violate collective norms. 36 As the following discussion illustrates, whites were able to coordinate their anti-competitive
behavior more efficiently by forming cartel-like organizations. 37
By 1920, whites in the Northern cities had begun to perceive
black migration into the cities as a significant threat to their way of
life. In those cities, school segregation followed closely from
neighborhood segregation. School officials in Northern cities often
maintained school segregation by redrawing feeder zones for schools
where the racial demographics were changing, and by Fsrrnitting
white students to transfer out of mixed school populations. 8
By comparison, in the South, whites focused more directly
on school segregation than on separation of residential location.39 Some southern cities passed segregation codes requirinJa
separate schools and separate buildings within the same school.
Southern school officials also acted informally and without authorization to separate schools, and continued to do so even after segregation codes were declared unconstitutional. 41
In the Southwest, whites perceived the rapid influx of Mexicans to be as much a social and economic threat as newly freed
blacks were in the North and South. Mexicans had migrated to
work on railroads and in agribusiness, and between 1920 and
1930, the Mexican population in California tripled. 42 From the
beginning, schools kept Mexican children separate, arguing that
separation was necessary to Americanize these students, and re-

36. See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 133, 150
(1994). See also Richard McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1046-48 (1995) (arguing that coercive social norms served to suppress defection and free-riders).
37. For a detailed account of cartel activities to secure neighborhood monopolies,
see Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation, supra note 11.
38. See Expert Report of Thomas J. Sugrue, Gratz v. Bollinger, (E. D. Mich.) (No.
97-75321); Gruttcr v. Bollinger (E.D. Mich.) (No. 97-75928).
39. In Southern cities, whites could not easily divide up the city by race-the creation of a ghetto was limited by spatial, technical and economic constraints. As in slavery,
blacks lived in close proximity to sources of work and economic support. See
WOODWARD, supra note 34.
40. For example, Louisville, Kentucky imposed a statutory requirement that blacks
and whites live in separate sections of the city. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917) (holding the Louisville statute unconstitutional).
41. See Cartwright v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Coffeyville, 73 Kan. 32,34 (boards
cannot act in the absence of a statute). But see 1909 Kan. Laws 525 (statute overturning
earher statute that had prohibited segregation).
42. See CHARLES WOLLENBERG, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: SEGREGATION AND
EXCLUSION, 1855-1975111 (1976).
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lying on stereotypes about health and morals. 43 Corporate
ranches in the Southwest created separate company towns,
which included schools for the children of laborers. 4 Some states
in the Southwest, including California, passed segregation laws
to authorize separate classrooms and buildings. 45
In all areas of the country, school boards effectively acted as
racial cartels, to coordinate school segregation across communities. School boards opened separate schools for black students at
the turn of the century, sometimes in separate buildings outside
of the main school and sometimes within the same building. 46 In
some states, members of the school board were also members of
white racist organizations, including the Ku Klux Klan, and they
coordinated school segregation with these other segregation efforts.47 For Mexican-Americans in California, school boards also
played a central role in keeping white and Mexican children in
separate classrooms. 48
In addition to school boards, parents' groups also worked in
cartel-like ways to monopolize access to good schools. Parents'
groups worked collectively to intimidate any black families seeking to integrate public schools. They also mobilized effectively
against those few school boards that argued to desegregate
school systems. For example, when a Detroit school board proposed an open schools plan that permitted blacks children to attend all-white schools, white parents' groups organized to petition the recall of elected school board members. They also
organized a school boycott, in which students boycotted classes
for several days. 49 In addition, parent organizations pressured
school officials to revise feeder district boundaries to keep
schools segregated, and lobbied for the passage of segregation
codes to keep schools separate. 50

43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., CAL EDUC. CODE§§ 8003-04.
46. See Board of Educ. of Ottawa v. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1 (1881), Knox v. Bd. of Educ.
of Ind., 45 Kan. 152 (1891) (moving from segregation inside the building-hiring special
educator-to segregation outside the school), Reynolds v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 66
Kan. 672 (1903) (separate building outside school). Rowles v. Bd. of Educ. of Wichita, 76
Kan. 361 (1907) (board passes a resolution to segregate "in keeping with the ideals and
wishes of a majority of patrons").
47. See Thurman-Watts v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Coffeyville, 115 Kan. 328
(1924) (president of the board admits membership).
48. See also WOLLENBERG, supra note 42, at 127.
49. See Expert Report, supra note 38; JEFFREY MIREL, THE RISE AND FALL OF AN
URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: DETROIT, 1907-81 188-93,258-61 (1999).
50. See Expert Report, supra note 38.
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The rhetoric surrounding school segregation drew in large
part on ideas about the potential competitiveness of blacks as labor. Whites wanted to monopolize education resources for
themselves in order to keep blacks from posing an economic
threat to white industry. In a speech to the Southern Education
Association justifying segregation in education, Professor Paul
Barringer invoked the idea of spending school resources only for
those who might move into skilled or professional labor: "The
Negro race is essentially a race of peasant farmers and laborers ... As a source of cheap labor for a warm climate he is beyond competition. "51
Motivated by the desire to exclude non-whites both economically and socially, white cartels thus secured a monopoly on
access to education resources As the next section discusses, these
resources are essential to producing the particular social skills,
high test scores and GPAs that law schools (and employers)
have come to value.
B. THE SELF-REINFORCING NATURE OF
EDUCATION MONOPOLY

This section argues that the white monopoly advantage in
education produced by these cartels may have become institutionally self-reinforcing over time. Historical segregation produced geographic pockets of people with better tax bases.
Neighborhoods with more educational resources have produced
neighbors with more wealth. In turn, neighbors with more
wealth have produced neighborhoods with more educational resources. In this way, white advantages in education reproduce
themselves over time.
According to recent research in complex systems theory and
economics, persistent racial inequality in education can be explained by the existence of "neighborhood effects" or "network
effects." Neighborhood effects are the self-reinforcing effects of
institutional relationships that link a family's well-being to that
of its neighborhood, and the neighborhood's status, in turn, to
that of the resident neighbor families. 52 Neighborhood effects
explain why neighborhood characteristics can become persistent
over time-the neighborhood affects the status of families, and
51. /d. at 95 (citing to speech before the Southern Education Association in 1900).
52. For a general overview of neighborhood effects, sec Xavier de Sousa Briggs,
Moving Up Versus Moving Out: Neighborhood Effects in Housing Mobility Programs, 8
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 195 (1997).
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families affect the status of the neighborhood. 53 Leonard Rubinowitz and James Rosenbaum have used the term "geography of
opportunity" to describe the idea that social capital is derived
from living in particular neighborhoods, and that neighborhoods
in turn benefit from particular kinds of people. 54
The effect of public school finance on neighborhood families constitutes a neighborhood effect that structures group
wealth and income. The school finance feedback loop consists of
two parts: (i) the way in which family wealth, and relatedly
property values, feed forward to affect neighborhood educational resources (because property taxes are used to fund public
schools); and (ii) the way in which neighborhood educational resources feed back to affect family wealth and property values. 55
As an aside, it is important to note here that the lock-in
model does not assume that educational resources affect a family's status by increasing cognitive skills in any intrinsically valuable way. Rather, the model merely assumes that education
functions to socialize children to perform in certain ways that are
valued by standardized tests and future employers. 56 Indeed, the
53. Much of this work on neighborhood effects and racial inequality focuses on the
self-reinforcing effects of "culture." See id. In contrast, this project focuses more on resource effects- the relatively more hard-edged constraints created by collective resources family and individual outcomes. Although psycho-social behaviors in neighborhoods may have important self-reinforcing effects via collective socialization, contagion
or relative deprivation, the research indicates that these behaviors ultimately are connected to the availability or lack of resources within a neighborhood. See, e.g., DALTON
CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LiVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY IN
AMERICA 23 (1999) ("[c]ultural practices constitute the manifestation of and reaction to
economic class conditions in which blacks and whites tend to find themselves").
54. Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum documented the results from the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program, a program that moved over 7100 black families to the Chicago
suburbs as part of a consent decree. These scholars found that for those families who
moved to the suburbs, 54% of children from those families enrolled in college, versus
21% of a control group who used their Section 8 benefits to move within the city. Of the
mothers who moved to the suburbs, 75% were working versus 41% of those who moved
to the city. Recent follow-up research has confirmed that these differences have persisted
over time. LEONARD RUBINOWITZ AND JAMES ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS
AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA (2000). To be sure,
there are difficulties with this data. Researchers could not disentangle the effects of selfselection-the families who chose to use their Section 8 certificates to move to white suburbs may have already represented a particular cross-section of the population. Relatedly, the comparison reference group (families who had not participated in the MTO
program counseling, and who used their Section 8 certificates to move to black neighborhoods) may not have represented a true control group because they also represent a particular cross-section of the population. See id.
55. This process has become racialized because segregation created racially homogenous neighborhoods with significant differences in income, wealth, property values
and educational spending per pupil. See infra Part Ila.
56. Sociologists have long put forward the notion that schools select and then so-
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model acknowledges that social preferences for particular kinds
of performances drive what is valued in economic, and therefore
educational, performance. 57
In the public school finance feedback loop, non-white
neighborhoods with poor tax bases produce under-funded
schools. In turn, underfunded schools produce non-white
neighborhoods with poor tax bases, because poorer schools produce graduates with less income and wealth. Likewise, white
neighborhoods with good tax bases produce schools with good
funding, which in turn produce a good tax base. In addition, because property with good schools costs more than property
without, non-white residents are less able to move to a
neighborhood with good schools.
A number of scholars have formally modeled this public
school finance neighborhood effect and its connection to residential segregation. 58 According to this research, the "neighborhood effects" of public school finance appear sufficiently strong
that, in otherwise economically mixed neighborhoods, small differences in public school financing will cause the neighborhoods
to become segre?ated by income, even in the absence of previous segregation. 5
Economist Roland Benabou's theoretical work illustrates
the dynamics of this process. 60 Benabou's model begins with two
neighborhoods that contain an equal mix of rich and poor families. If education spending per pupil in one neighborhood becomes slightly higher than the other, the land in the neighborhood with better schools becomes more valuable, and rich
families are more able to purchase the property. In turn, families
in neighborhoods with higher education spending become even
wealthier, and accordingly are able to devote even more of their
income to school finance (which in turn makes the property even
more expensive). Because the improvement in income becomes
self reinforcing by way of school funding, even minor differences
cialize students for future employment. See, e.g., Talcott Parsons, The School Class as a
Social System, 29 HARV. EDUC. REV. 297 (1959).
57. See Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Merit and Bias, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1997) (arguing that social norms produce notions of what constitutes
merit).
58. Roland Bcnabou, Equity and Efficiency in Human Capita/Investment: The Local Connection, 63 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 237, 238 (1996); see also Shelley Lundberg and
Richard Startz, On the Persistence of Racial Inequality, 16 J. LABOR ECON. 292 (1998).
59. See id.
60. See Benabou, supra note 58. See also Roland Benabou, Human Capital, Inequality and Growth: A Local Perspective, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 817 (1994).
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in education spending can cause neighborhoods to segregate by
income. 61 This is true even when the incomes for both groups are
growing. 62
Benabou's model demonstrates that the public school finance loop and its links to the tax base can transmit education
inequality indefinitely over many generations. 63 Because of relative advantages in the tax base and per pupil expenditures,
wealthy neighborhoods are more likely to sustain their affluence
over time, and thus the superiority of their educational resources. Moreover, the gap between rich and poor can grow infinitely large, at least in theory. 64
Most importantly for this project, Benabou concludes that
racial disparities in education may now be locked in because of
the self-reinforcing effects of historical segregation. 65 According
to Benabou, historical segregation accomplished two important
goals. First, segregation created a white neighborhood surplus by
increasing the spending per pupil (and/or lowering tax rates),
and thereby increasing the value of property in the neighborhood (which now reflected the availability of well-funded
schools). 66 More importantly, segregation allowed whites to monopolize the benefit of the extra spending per pupil, and to avoid
having to pay the higher land prices they would have to pay if
blacks had been allowed to bid on the land. 67 Non-whites looking
to move to white neighborhoods must pay the correlative value
of the additional social capital. 68
Thus, in Benabou's view, these advantages may now be
locked in because blacks do not possess sufficient wealth to
move into richer white neighborhoods with better schools. 69
61. In Bcnabou's model, the wealthy arc more willing or more able to pay higher
housing costs for three reasons. First, wealthy families as a matter of preference may be
more sensitive to neighborhood quality. Second, capital market imperfections may disable the poor from borrowing to be able to move into the wealthier neighborhoods. Finally, differences in lifetime wealth can also explain the relatively greater ability of the
wealthy to pay. See Benabou, supra note 58, at 233-43.
62. See id.
63. See id. See also Steven Durlau[, Neighborhood Effects, in 4 HANDBOOK OF
REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2 (J.V. Henderson and J.F. Thisse eds., 2003).
64. See id. at 519. In addition, stratification of this type exerts maximum effect on
inequality-that is, it maximizes the income of the wealthiest family, at the same time it
minimizes the income of the lowest-income family. See id. at 516.
65. See Benabou, Local Connection, supra note 58, at 247.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. It is important to note here the difference between wealth and income. Although a number of studies report that housing segregation cannot be explained by rac1al
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Blacks are no longer barred by law, but are now barred by the
relatively more difficult time they have buying into an increasingly expensive white neighborhood. 70 Benabou concludes that
remedies are unlikely to be effective if neighborhood differences
already have become locked in. Equalizing school budgets is not
likely to work because the cumulative disadvantage is now too
great to overcome. Nor at this late stage would it be effective to
increase incentives to lure rich families to poor communities. 71
The public school finance loop also reproduces inequalities
in access to higher education. People who attend underfunded
public schools are less likely to earn the kind of income or acquire the kind of wealth necessary to pay for higher education. 72
Because of the substantial wealth gap between races, many if not
most black and Latino/a parents cannot offer their children any
significant assistance in attending college. 73
Almost all scholars on the subject agree that a college degree,
or any time spent in higher education, enables a person to get jobs
that pay more, which in turn leads to greater income and greater
wealth accumulation. 74 The net worth of graduates with college
degrees is double that of those without degrees. 75 In turn, families
with greater wealth are far more likely to be able to send children
to college or university, owing to skyrocketing costs for tuition
these days. 76 Racial disparities in wealth, not surprisingly, reproduce themselves via the opportunity to attend college. 77
To be sure, the general question of whether increased funding
per student corresponds to improved education and/or improved
wealth is controversial. One of the earliest studies on the matter,
the 1966 Coleman Report, found little association between funding
differences in income, those studies do not take into account differences in accumulated
wealth, which is more important in housing purchases. See MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL
EQUALITY (1995).
70. See id. See also Durlauf, supra note 63, at 520 (concluding that the possible
permanence of inequality seems appropriate for analyzing the U.S. economy, where the
economic status of blacks has been so strongly affected by historical factors).
71. See Benabou, supra note 58.
72. See Thomas J. Kane, College Attendance By Blacks Since 1970: The Role of College Cost, Family Background and Returns to Education, 102 J. POUT. ECON. 878 (1994).
73. In Michigan, college attendance for four or more years differs between blacks
and whites by a ratio of 56 to 1, and college degrees by a ratio of 85 to 1, both ratios having steadily increased over the last thirty years. Expert Report, supra note 39 tbl. 10 (figures for 1990).
74. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 69, at 81.
75. !d. at 82.
76. See Kane, supra note 72.
77. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 69.
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per student and educational performance. 78 However, more recent
studies prove that certain kinds of expenditure are strongly correlated with achievement, and with subsequent income and wealth.
Many of the relevant studies on the spending-achievement correlation do not differentiate in how money is spent in school districts,
and simply look at the levels of overall spending by school districts.
More precise studies demonstrate that when money is spent on cutting class size and reducing the student-teacher ratio, improving instructional materials and improving central office administration,
student achievement goes up significantly. 79
The lock-in model of inequality in education provides a possible explanation for why GP As and LSAT scores continue to
vary dramatically between whites and certain non-white groups.
To be sure, LSAT scores are strongly correlated with family assets and neighborhood educational resources. Indeed, it is remarkable to note that the correlation between family income
and the SAT scores for college freshman is stronger than the link
between the test score and college grades. 80
The lock-in model suggests that these disparities may well
be locked in permanently, or at least for the long-term future.
Without significant intervention to dismantle the institutional
feedback loops between income, neighborhood, school resources
and conventional measures of merit, institutions of higher learning will continue to need some race-conscious form of affirmative action to create diverse student populations.
III. GRUTTER FROM THE LEFT
What are the implications of this lock-in model for the
Court's decision in Grutter? This section draws on the foregoing
description of the lock-in model to develop three critiques of
78. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, (U.S.
Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare,1966).
79. Harold H. Weglinsky, How Money Matters: Models of the Effect of School District
Spending on Academic Achievement, 70 J. Eouc. Soc. 3 (1997). See also Linda DarlingHammond, Teacher Policy and Student Achievement: A Review of State Policy Evidence, 8
Eouc. PoL'Y A:>~ALYSIS ARCHIVES (Jan. 1, 2(XX)), at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaalv8n1/ (recent
research demonstrates that school size, class size, curriculum and teacher qualifications make a
significant difference to performance).
80. See Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, The Fwure of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 988 nn.148-52 (citing to statistics showing that
the correlation between the SAT and income was 0.4 compared to a correlation of between 0.29 and 0.37 for SAT scores and freshman grades). Likely the correlation with
accumulated wealth and standardized test scores is significantly higher. See OLIVER &
SHAPIRO, supra note 69.
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Grutter. First, Justice O'Connor's aspirational time frame of
twenty-five years is unrealistic. To the extent that racial disparities
are locked-in, these disparities are unlikely to disappear by the
year 2028. Second, Grutter produces no real material gains for
communities of color. Small-scale diversity-based programs admit
few students, and the Court's opinion further forecloses the kind
of large-scale affirmative action necessary to dismantle lock-in.
Finally, the decision in Grutter appears to serve white interests more than it does the interests of communities of color. The
diversity rationale itself symbolically reproduces racial inequality
by prioritizing white interests. In addition, the Court's opinion
endorses meritocracy as a compelling government interest, notwithstanding the fact that conventional meritocratic standards
privilege white applicants and exclude people of color. Diversityoriented affirmative action also conceals the racially disparate
impact of conventional admissions standards, and permits institutions to represent such a process as neutral and fair.
A. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AND COUNTING:
THE ARTIFICIAL SUNSET CLAUSE

Given the locked-in nature of inequality, Justice O'Connor's
twenty-five year aspirational pronouncement in Gruffer seems at
best naively optimistic and at worst dangerously indifferent to the
self-reinforcing dynamics of racial inequality (even if it is dicta). No
evidence exists to support O'Connor's expectation that the wide racial gaps in LSAT scores or G PAs will disappear before the year
2025. Indeed, most available evidence points to the contrary. 81
One wonders why Justice O'Connor chose to set a twentyfive year deadline in Grutter. Justice O'Connor may merely have
been offering a concession to her more conservative colleagues,
proposing a time limit in order to make upholding affirmative
action programs more palatable. The duration of programs is a
factor the Court must consider in assessing whether an affirmative action program is sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster. 82 From the context of her pronouncement,
one might guess that O'Connor was setting an artificial deadline
in order to render such programs constitutional. 83 (Or perhaps
81. See Trial Transcript, T ~stimony of David Whit~. Director of Public Testing,
Grul!cr v. Bollinger, Civ. Action No. 97-75'!28 (E.D. Mich.) 137 (testifying the racial gap
in LSAT scores has p~rsist~d for the past twenty-five years). See also WIGHTMA~. supra
note 6, at 8-14; THE BLACK WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 6.
82. See Grul!cr v. Bollinger. 53lJ U.S. 306,341-42 (2003).
83. See Amar & Caminkcr. mpra note 2, at 542 (suggesting that O'Connor included
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her pronouncement was meant simply to compel policymakers
to put far more energy into reducing test score and GPA gaps.) 84
The lock-in model suggests that, until policymakers address
the more general problem of lock-in, the test score and educational achievement gap may persist or even widen. As a result,
setting a twenty-five year deadline for diversity-oriented affirmative action might well put communities of color in a no-win position. On the one hand, Justice O'Connor's opinion announces an
artificially limited sunset clause for diversity-oriented affirmative
action programs. On the other, anti-discrimination law requires
that affirmative action be limited in scope. As the next section
will discuss, these small-scale, limited programs can do nothing
to eliminate locked-in racial disparities in meritocratic measures
of admission.
B. "NO PAIN, NO GAIN:" THE NEED FOR LARGE-SCALE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION

The lock-in model also suggests that, although the Court's
decision in Grutter is important for symbolic reasons, small scale
affirmative action will produce very little material gain for most
people of color. To be sure, affirmative action in higher education provides great benefits for the limited number of students
who gain admission under such programs. The Grutter decision
is also symbolically very important, because the Court's holding
for the moment stems the neo-conservative effort to completely
eliminate race-conscious preferences.
At the same time, at a material level, small-scale affirmative
action does little for communities of color. 85 The number of students admitted through such programs is small, relative to the
number of minority students enrolled in four-year colleges and
universities. 86 Only 20-30% of the institutions of higher learning

the

~xpectation

to render affirmative action necessarily limited in duration).
84. See id. (suggesting that O'Connor may have been signaling to policymakers to
prioritize the issue of disparities).
85. Small scale affirmative action programs might have constituted an opportunity
for law schools ami undergraduate institutions to experiment with alternative conceptualizations of merit and revisions to the law school curriculum, if not its mission. I have
argued elsewhere that affirmative action programs might also be valuable to the extent
that they put into place leaders of tomorrow who will re-evaluate the concept of ment
and the racialized nature of that concept. See Roithmayr, supra note 57.
86. For example, in the fall of 2000, about a million African-American and "Hispanic" students enrolled in public four year institutions. See AMERICAt' ASSOCIATIOS
OF STATE COLLEGES ASD Ut-:IYERSITIES, FALL 1990- FALL 2000 ENROL~ENT REPORT6
(20tXl).
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are sufficiently selective that they use race to admit applicants. 87
And in those institutions, affirmative action is responsible for a
relatively small (albeit symbolically very important) number of
applicants of color. For example, in 1989, affirmative action facilitated the admission of black applicants to at most an additional 5-6% of an entering class for most selective institutions. 88
Moreover, for the majority in communities of color who will not
apply to college or professional school, affirmative action in elite
law schools does little to improve their relative material position.
In addition, the lock-in model of inequality suggests that
small-scale programs of the sort endorsed in Grutter can do very
little to reduce disparities. Instead, the model suggests that largescale affirmative action and redistribution of wealth (perhaps via
reparations) is necessary to reduce racial differences in GPAs
and standardized test scores. First, the lock-in model suggests
that affirmative action needs to be quite massive in magnitude to
overcome the self-reinforcing effects of earlier monopoly conduct. For example, Shelly Lundberg and Richard Startz point
out that, under a lock-in model of persistent inequality, the selfreinforcing nature of early advantage may require a large temporary intervention -large enough to jump start a reversal of
self-reinforcing advantage. 89
Second, the lock-in model suggests that massive affirmative
action is needed on multiple fronts, in order to dismantle the institutional web of structures that reproduces disparity. If educational inequality is irrevocably linked to housing and employment, then policymakers cannot address educational disparity
without also simultaneous!~ addressing housing, employment,
public services and finance. ° Finally, the lock-in model emphasizes the need for wealth redistribution and reparations, to com-

87.

See Gary Orficld, CampllS Resegregation and Its Alternatives, in CHILLING
See also WILLIAM G. BOWEN &

ADMISSIO~S 7 (Gary Orfield & Edward Miller eds., 1998).

DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF TilE RIVER: LOJ>G-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CO!'SIDERING
RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS xx.xviii (1998) (300 institutions).
88. See id. at 41 fig. 2.11 (showing actual and hypothetical black matriculants as a
percentage of all College and Beyond matriculants, demonstrating the difference bet ween race-conscious and race-neutral admissions policies, for the year 1989).
89. According to Lundberg and Startz, in the area of residential segregation, the
self-reinforcing nature of neighborhood capital on segregation means that even small
differences will still induce wealthier whites to move out of the neighborhoods. To reverse outmigration, neighborhood subsidies would need to be sufficiently large to overcome the self-reinforcing differences between white and non-white neighborhood capital.
See Lundberg & Startz, supra note 58.
90.

See id.
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pensate for the cumulative effects of self-reinforcing advantage
in terms of assets. 91
Unfortunately, Grutter and a long line of previous cases effectively foreclose the sort of large-scale affirmative action necessary to dismantle lock-in. Affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest. 92 Neither automatic point
awards nor ~uotas based on race are permitted, even on a temporary basis. 3 Affirmative action to remedy past discrimination
is too narrowly circumscribed in employment and education to
serve as the foundation for large-scale policy interventions. 94
Perhaps most importantly, affirmative action pro,f}rams cannot be used to remedy "societal discrimination." Because
locked-in discrimination cannot be traced to a contemporary individual who intentionally discriminates, locked-in disparities
are likely to be classified as "societal discrimination. " 96 But in
the Court's view, permitting affirmative action programs to remedy societal discrimination would justify too much in the way of
government intervention. 97
Under Grutter, diversity programs are likewise just as circumscribed. Diversity programs must be narrowl.fs tailored to
achieve the purpose of diversifying the institution. 8 Institutions
cannot use quotas, and can only use race as one of several "plus"
factors accorded to applicants who demonstrate the potential to
contribute a diverse perspective. 99 Although institutions can admit a "critical mass" of applicants via a diversity program, they
can do so only to the extent that there is a relationship between
the numbers admitted and the educational diversity benefits to
the institution. 100 The lock-in model suggests that these nar-

91. See id. at 318-20 (reparations or additional subsidies need to remedy disparities
in accumulated wealth). See also Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation, supra note 11, at 54.
92. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
93. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
94. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200 (suggesting that the Court would be unlikely to
accept affirmative action to remedy past discrimination where there is no proof that the
entity adopting the program has discriminated nor proof that the individuals who arc
benefitting from the program were the victims of past discrimination).
95. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,274 (1986).
96. See Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation, supra note 11.
97. See id.
98. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,334 (2003).
99. See id.
I 00. Cruller. 539 U.S at 336.
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rowly-tailored, limited programs will make no dent in reducing
racial disparities in admissions.
C. THE REPRODUCfiON OF WHITE

ADVANTAGE

This section argues that the Court's opinion in Grutter affirmatively privileges white interests, for three reasons. First, the
diversity rationale itself tends to prioritize white interests, because the rationale focuses on the value that students of color
add to the existing merit-admitted (and predominantly white)
classroom. Second, the Grutter opinion endorses the kind of
"meritocratic" decisionmaking that privileges the admission of
white applicants and excludes people of color. Finally, as is made
clear by the Court's legitimacy rationale, diversity-oriented programs make it easier for institutions to conceal the discriminatory impact of conventional admissions standards, to the benefit
of white students.
1. Undue Burdens, Undue Benefits
As articulated in Grutter, the diversity rationale appears to
prioritize white interests, even as the rationale purports to include the interests of communities of color. In a line of cases extending back as far as Bakke, the modern Court has discussed
the need to make sure that affirmative action does not unduly
burden the interest of whites. 101 In Grutter, however, parts of the
Court's opinion appear to go beyond limiting undue burdens for
whites, to affirmatively privileging white interests. 102
For example, the Court's discussion about the importance
of a diverse student body suggests that diversity focuses on benefits to white students. In the Court's view, when students of a

101. In the Court's opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell focused on the burden of af·
firmativc action to "innocent whites" and their subsequent resentment. Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 295 (1978). In Richmond v. Croson the Court rejected an affirmative action program
in large part because of its impact on whites. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989). Justice Scalia's concurrence warned that treating whites "unfairly" could lead to
racial hostility. "((E]ven benign racial quotas have victims, whose very real injustice we
ignore whenever we deny them enforcement of their right not to be disadvantaged on the
basis of race .... When we depart from this American principle we play with fire, and
much more than an occasional DeFunis, Johnson or Croson burns." Croson, 488 U.S. at
527. See also id. at 494 (majority opinion mentions possible racial hostility deriving from
stigma).
102. The Court's opinion in Gratz v. Bollinger rejected the undergraduate pointsbased program in part because of the Court's concern that the white Italian-American or
white artist would not be able to gain entry as a diversity candidate. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003).
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wide variety of backgrounds are present, '"classroom discussion
is livelier, more spirited and simply more enlightening and inter103
esting. "' Likewise, students are "better prepare[ d] for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepare[d]
... as professionals." 104
To be sure, the Court suggests generally that all students
present in the classroom will benefit, including students of color.
But those students who will be "better" prepared, and for whom
classroom discussion comparatively is "livelier" and "more interesting" are presumably those white students who have already
been admitted to elite institutions on the basis of conventional
admissions standards. 105 Indeed, much of the University of
Michigan's expert research supported the diversity argument by
looking to the benefits that white students obtained from crossracial interaction. 106
Likewise, the critical mass concept is one that, paradoxically, appears to prioritize white interests. In the Court's view,
admitting a critical mass of students of color is desirable primarily because critical mass breaks down stereotypes for those who
believe that minorities espouse a monolithic viewpoint. In approving the law school affirmative action program, the Court
cites to the University of Michigan's argument that a critical
mass is essential to diminish the stereotypical "belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue." 107
Of course, given the persistence of segregation in employment, education and housing, minority students are far less likely
to fall into the trap of believing that minority students express
some monolithic viewpoint. Indeed, those students are far more
likely already to have been exposed to a critical mass of people
of color, with a range of viewpoints, when they come to law
103. See Gmtter, 539 U.S. at330.
104. See id.
105. The Brid for the American Association for Educational Research, to which the
Court cites, refers primarily to the expert report of Patricia Gurin, which focuses significantly on surveys of white students in ascertaining the benefits of cross-racial exposure.
See Brief for the American Educational Research Association et al, as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents Before the U.S. Supreme Court, Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003) (02-241).
\06. See Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, Gratz v. Bollinger (E.D. Mich.) (No. 9775321 ); "Empirical Results From the Analysis Conducted for This Litigation: The Effect
of Structural Diversity on Classroom and Informal Interactional Diversity," Grutter v.
Bollinger, No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich.) (discussing comparative benefits to white students
with varying degrees of exposure to students of color).
107. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
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school. In contrast, many whites who attend law school will encounter classmates of color for the first time, having also attended segregated public schools and lived in segregated
neighborhoods. 108 Again, the particular benefit of cross-racial
understanding and breaking down stereotypes that diversity
programs provide likely inures primarily to white students. 109
The Court also finds that diversity in education is compelling because it is good for business. 110 Although benefits to business are not exclusively benefits to whites, it is important to note
the Court's marked shift from a rationale focusing on the benefits to non-whites of eliminating the vestiges of slavery or remedying past discrimination to focusing on benefits to business and
the military. 111
It should perhaps come as no surprise that the opinion in
Grutter focuses on white interests in this way. After all, given the
Court's restrictive jurisprudence on remedial affirmative action,
the University of Michigan (perhaps smartly) chose not to push
any argument that would have focused more directly on benefits
to communities of color. 112 In addition, the structure of the lawsuit itself contributed to a privileging of white interests- the case
asked a state institution to justify an affirmative action program
on the basis of the institution's existing mission. The lock-in
model suggests that, as institutional structures- for example, the
institutional mission and objectives-grow up around white advantage, those practices will serve to reproduce the early advantage that whites acquired by way of monopoly.
Derrick Bell writes that material gains come to communities
of color only when those gains serve white interests. 113 Grutter
demonstrates Bell's point. In Grutter, the compelling government interest that the Court uses to justify race-conscious admissions preferences is neither remedying past discrimination nor
reducing societal discrimination, nor even benefitting the small
numbers of students who are admitted via diversity programs.
Rather, the Court finds a compelling interest in diversifying the
classroom for the benefit of white students.
See Expert Report, mpra note 106.
Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 328-29.
110. See id.
Ill. See David W1lkms, From "Separate Is lnheremly Unequal" 10 "Dtversuy ts Good
for Busmess: The Rtse of Market-Based Dnermy Argumems and the Fate of 1he Black
Corporate Bar, 117 HARV L REV 1548 (2004)
112. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
113. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the /merest Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518,524 (1980).
I 08.
I 09.
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2. Meritocracy vs. Diversity

The Court's opinion in Grutter favors white interests in a
second way: by endorsing and protecting elite meritocracy, despite the fact that meritocratic admissions standards disproportionately exclude applicants of color. To justify this move, the
Court assumes that racial diversity and academic excellence are
at odds with one another, and cannot be reconciled except
through diversity-based affirmative action programs. So, for example, the Court declares that a narrowly tailored diversity program does not "require a university to choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to
provide educational opportunities to members of all racial
groups." 114 Likewise, the Court assumes that decreasing emphasis on GPA and LSAT scores would constitute a dramatic sacrifice of "academic quality of all admitted students" and "a vital
component of [the law school's] educational mission. " 115
The assumption that academic excellence and diversity are
at odds with one another is deeply embedded in much of both
liberal and conservative thinking about affirmative action. Under this view, institutions are structurally pressured to choose between their commitment to academic excellence (associated with
success on numerical measures of quality) and the importance of
admitting applicants of color (whose scores are not as high on
measures of excellence). In this putative dichotomy, excellence is
equated with (disproportionately white) success on the LSAT
and in GPAs; admitting applicants of color is equated with sacrifice of standards. Affirmative action then becomes a way to
avoid the hard choice.
But the Court ignores several important facts in constructing the parameters of this choice. First, the Court assumes that
excellence is measured by GPA and LSAT scores, which are
very heavily weighted in the conventional admissions process.
Available evidence points to the contrary, however, that LSAT
scores and GPA constitute very poor predictors of first-year
grades, let alone of overall excellence. According to the Law
School Admissions Council, the median predictive power of the
LSAT for first -year grades is low: the test score explains only
16% of the variance in first year grades. A combined index ex116
plains only 25% of first-year grades.
Beyond first-year per114.
115.
116.

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
See id. at 340.
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, LSAT & LSDAS REGISTRATI0:-1 &
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formance, numerical measures are even less predictive of overall
academic success, future )ob satisfaction, income, leadership or
community contribution. 1 7
Second, the Court assumes that the admission of students of
color with lower scores entails a sacrifice of excellence. Again,
available evidence points to precisely the contrary conclusion.
William Bowen and Derek Bok have extensively documented
the fact that admitting students of color with lower G PAs and
scores requires no sacrifice of excellence. 118 Students of color
with lower numbers who graduate from selective institutions
earn adequate grades, graduate at similar rates, earn similar incomes, achieve advanced degrees and leadership ~ositions at
even higher rates, and enjoy similar job satisfaction.''
Third, the Court assumes that current conceptions of merit
are race-neutral and not connected to the early white "firstmover" monopoly advantage that the lock-in model describes. In
earlier work, I have argued that first-mover monopolist groups
can use the concept of "standards" to define selection criteria in
ways that continue to favor themselves. 120 Given that whites monopolized the legal profession during its Jim Crow days, we
should not find it surprising that law school admissions standards
continue to favor white a,Rplicants and disproportionately exclude applicants of color.'-' Moreover, just as educational disparities are locked in, so too are merit standards, owing to the
self-reinforcing signaling effect of LSAT scores in law school

INFORMATION BOOK 121 (2002) (""Correlation is stated as a coefficient for which UXJ indi·
cates an exact correspondence between candidates' test scores and subsequent law school performance .... The closer to 1.00 the correlation cocflicient is, the greater the test's predictive
validity .... The correlation between LSAT scores and first-year grades varies from one Ia"'
school to another .... During 2()()(), validity studies were conducted for 183 law schools. Correlations between LSAT scores ranged from 0.13 to 0.62 (median is 0.41 ). Correlations between
LSAT scores combined with undergraduate grade-point averages and first-year law school
grades ranged from 0.26 to 0.67 (median is 0.50). ").To be sure, many argue that although the
LSA Tis a poor predictor, it is the best instrument law schools have. Philip D. Shelton, Admissions Tests: Not Perfect, Just the Best Measures We Have, CHRON. OF HIGHER Eouc., July 6,
2001, at B15. Even so, given the costs in terms of excluding people of color, such low predictive
value makes continued usc hard to justify.
117. See Richard 0. Lempert et al., From the Trenches and Towers: Michigan's Minority Graduate in Practice: The River Runs Through the Law School, 25 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 395, 468-69 (20lXJ) (empirical study or Michigan graduates showing that graduates of color who had been admitted with lower scores and GPAs were as successful as
white graduates with higher scores).
118. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 87.
119. See id.
120. See Daria Roithmayr, Barriers co Emry, supra note 11.
121. See id.
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rankings (and relatedly, employer hiring preferences and alumni
donations ). 122
Notwithstanding the disproportionate impact of meritocratic standards, the Court goes out of its way to extend quasiconstitutional protection of the law school's interest in elite
standards of excellence. At oral argument, Justice Scalia asked
Michigan's counsel why the law school did not reduce emphasis
on the LSAT and GPA, in order to diversify its student body. 123
Counsel Maureen Mahoney answered that the school should not
have to choose, and then argued expressly that the state had a
compelling interest not only in diversity but in elite academic excellence as well. 124
In its opinion, the Court accepts the law school's argument
that elite institutions should not have to choose between excellence and diversity. As Justice Scalia points out, in so doing, the
Court implicitly finds that the government's interest in elite
meritocracy is compelling. 125 At the very least, the Court finds
that the government's interest in elite meritocracy is sufficiently
compelling that the law school is not required to reduce weight
on LSAT scores and GPA in order to diversify.
This ruling is quite troubling, for two reasons. First, the
Court's implicit holding appears to ignore the discriminatory impact of conventional standards. In any cost-benefit analysis that
properly considers the interests of communities of color, the discriminatory effect of LSATs and GPAs should outweigh the limited predictive value of those measures. Second, and relatedly,
the Court's holding on this issue potentially eviscerates any future constitutional challenge to elite standards that disproportionately or wholly exclude people of color. Indeed, courts could
potentially rule that a law school's interest in remaining an elite
institution constitutes a sufficiently compelling interest to justify
complete exclusion of people of color on the basis of LSAT
scores. 126
See id.
Transcript, Oral Argument, Gruttcr v. Bollinger, No. 02-241 32 (Aprill, 2003).
··There is a compelling interest in having an institution that is both academically
~xccllcnt and racially diverse, because our leaders need to be trained in institutions that
arc excellent, that arc superior academically, but they also need to be trained with exposure to the viewpoints, to the perspectives, to the experiences of individuals from diverse
backgrounds." See id. at 32-33.
125. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,353-54 (2003).
126. As mentioned earlier, non-whites arc far more disproportionately excluded on
the top end of the standardized test score spectrum. See Lmest News, supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
122.
123.
12-+.
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In reconciling the so-called tension between meritocracy
and diversity via affirmative action, elite meritocracy appears to
take far more than its share. Small-scale diversity-oriented affirmative action programs pose no real threat to the interests
that meritocracy protects (which, one suspects, is precisely what
makes them acceptable to elite institutions). These limited programs do not require institutions to systematically eliminate the
racially disparate impact of conventional standards. Likewise,
these programs have no effect on the institutionally locked-in
inequality that perpetuates white monopoly benefits.
C. DISGUISING RACIAL PRIVILEGE AS RACE-NEUTRAL
The Court's opinion in Grutter benefits whites in a third ( albeit indirect) way. In particular, Grutter approves the kind of
small-scale diversity-oriented programs that conceal the institutional bias of conventional admissions standards. Because whites
are disproportionately favored by such standards, disguising such
racial bias benefits white interests.
Recent research and experience in several states confirms
that the small-scale affirmative action conceals the race-specific
impact of the conventional focus on LSA T and GP A. In both
Texas and California, where government was prohibited from
using race in admissions decisions, institutional reliance on conventional admissions standards produced highly segregated law
school and undergraduate populations. 127 The dramatic resegregation that followed passage of Proposition 209 and the announcement of the Hopwood decision persuaded Texas and
California legislatures to adopt the so-called "X percent" plans
for undergraduate institutions. 128
Prior to Hopwood and Proposition 209, none of these legislatures had taken any sort of action with regard to the racially
disparate impact of conventional admissions standards. No evidence exists that legislators were even aware of racial disparities
in LSATs and GPAs. The existence of small-scale affirmative action programs had successfully concealed the way in which those
standards disproportionately excluded applicants of color.
127. Texas automatically admits the top 10% of each school's graduating class to
each "general academic teaching institution." TEX. Eouc. CODE ANN. 51.803 (West
2001). California admits the top 4% and Florida admits the top 20%. See Jeffrey Selingo,
What Srates Aren't Saying Abow the 'X-Percem Solwion,' CHR0:-.1. HIGHER Eouc. at
A31, A32 (2000).
128. Experts uniformly agree that such plans are race-conscious in nature because
they rely on the segregated nature of schools in order to produce racial diversity. See id.
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Likewise, at the national level, small-scale diversity-oriented
affirmative action conceals nationwide disparities. Research indicates that elite law school populations would quickly resegregate
on the basis of conventional admissions standards to become almost exclusively white. Linda Wightman has documented the
dramatic impact on students of color that a purel~ "color-blind"
admissions process would have in legal education. 1 9 According to
her research, such processes would produce dramatic drops in the
number of students of color at law schools, and not just at the elite
schools. 130 Similarly, the University of Michigan Law School's expert, Stephen Raudenbush, testified that, in the absence of any
race-conscious preference, under-represented minorities would
constitute only 4% of the law school's entering class, as opposed
to the actual14.5%. 131
Diversity-based affirmative action serves to hide these facts.
Diversity programs permit law schools to represent their meritocratic admissions standards as race-neutral, fair and "legitimate," despite the fact that these standards exclude almost all
applicants of color. The Court's opinion in Grutter is quite open
about this legitimating function of diversity-based programs. "In
order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of
the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly
open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity."132 Thus, diversity is useful because it helps to convince
people that meritocracy is fair and legitimate, despite the fact
that meritocratic standards at the most elite range exclude virtually all applicants of color.
CONCLUSION
This Essay offers three central insights from the left in
evaluating Grutter's small-scale affirmative action program.
First, if Justice O'Connor truly expects the country to abandon
race-conscious preferences within the next twenty-five years,
then government must be allowed to address what the Court has
termed "societal discrimination." The law must expand the definition of discrimination to include racial disparities that can be

129. See Linda Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race As a Factor in Law School Admissions
Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997).
130. See id.
131. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320.
132. See id. at 332.

2004]

A RADICAL CRITIQUE OF GRUTIER

219

traced to historical anti-competitive exclusion, at the very least.
Elsewhere I have argued that the U.S. should adopt a definition
of discrimination that more closely resembles that used in South
Africa and Canada, a definition that would encompass actions
that serve to reinforce locked-in discrimination. 133
Second, and relatedly, the Court should endorse large-scale
affirmative action, at least as a temporary jumpstart to reversing
the locked-in effects of a three hundred year monopoly. Indeed,
in the spirit of antitrust law, institutional structures that perpetuate monopoly ought to be dismantled altogether. For example,
law schools ought to be required to reduce or eliminate the
weight of the LSAT and GPA, in law school admissions based
on their racially disproportionate impact. Just as the Court approved the dissolution of AT&T and Standard Oil, so too should
institutions be required to radically restructure in order to dismantle racial monopoly. 134
Third, all institutions, selective and otherwise, should develop a set of admissions standards that are both "fair and functional. " 135 To be fair, admissions standards should not systematically and disproportionately exclude people of color or the poor
(or any other discrete and definable group) on the basis of selfreinforcing advantage that can be traced to historical anticompetitive conduct. Law schools and other institutions of
higher learning should commit themselves to developing standards that promote participation by all segments of society.
To be functional, admissions criteria should more accurately
predict a student's ability to benefit from a program of education. As it is, conventional merit standards defer far too heavily
to measures of merit that do not even accurately predict for firstyear performance, let alone overall performance in school or
success in the profession. Law schools should re-tool their assessments of merit to more closely correspond with those skills
and abilities that are required for the everyday practice of law, to
include client listening and interviewing, case management and
other clinical skills.
Having sounded the harsh note of critique, it is extremely
important to re-iterate the importance of diversity-based affirmative action to the symbolic commitment to racial empowerment. It is important, of course, for those of us on the left to
133.
134.
135.

See Roiihmayr, Locked In Segregation, supra note 11.
See id.
See Guinier & Sturm, supra note 80.
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remain committed to preserving affirmative action no matter the
scale, even as conservatives gear up for another round of attacks
on diversity-based programs. Race-conscious affirmative action
serves as a symbolic bulwark, a race-conscious counter to the
meritocratic admissions standards that serve to reproduce racial
inequality. But those of us on the left should also recognize the
significant limitations of diversity-based program and the importance of dismantling locked-in monopoly of resources. It is important that we not abandon the more expansive view of racial
justice in the quest to preserve the limited remedy of affirmative
action.
Ironically, the issue of diversity-based affirmative action exposes an issue on which scholars on the left and conservatives
claim to agree: both sides argue that affirmative action does little
to address the dramatic disparities in access to educational resources. As Kimberle Crenshaw points out, however, conservatives do not appear willing to devote significant resources and
energy to eliminate racial disparities at the primary and secondary levels. 136 At the same time, radical scholars need to continue to devote as much energy to that fight as to the fight to
preserve affirmative action-and now, in the wake of Justice
O'Connor's twenty-five year sunset clause, perhaps even more
quickly.

136. Kimberle Crc:nshaw, Beyond Affirmative Action: The Twenty-Five Year Detente,
at http.//www.aapf.org/pagcs/dctcnte.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004) (pointing out that
no serious steps were taken by proponents of Proposition 209 after the passage ol the
referendum to secure real educational equality).

